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ABSTRACT 
The 22
nd
 February 2011, Mw 6.3 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand caused major damage to 
critical infrastructure, including the healthcare system. The Natural Hazard Platform of NZ funded a 
short-term project called “Hospital Functions and Services” to support the Canterbury District Health 
Board’s (CDHB) efforts in capturing standardized data that describe the effects of the earthquake on 
the Canterbury region’s main hospital system. The project utilised a survey tool originally developed 
by researchers at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) to assess the loss of function of hospitals in the 
Maule and Bío-Bío regions following the 27
th
 February 2010, Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake in Chile. This 
paper describes the application of the JHU tool for surveying the impact of Christchurch earthquake 
on the CDHB Hospital System, including the system’s residual capacity to deliver emergency 
response and health care. A short summary of the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on other 
CDHB public and private hospitals is also provided. This study demonstrates that, as was observed in 
other earthquakes around the world, the effects of damage to non-structural building components, 
equipment, utility lifelines, and transportation were far more disruptive than the minor structural 
damage observed in buildings (FEMA 2007). Earthquake related complications with re-supply and 
other organizational aspects also impacted the emergency response and the healthcare facilities’ 
residual capacity to deliver services in the short and long terms.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Mw 6.3 Christchurch earthquake struck the city at 12:51pm on Tuesday, the 22
nd
 February 2011 
(GNS 2011). The earthquake caused 185 fatalities, and approximately 8,600 injuries, and widespread 
damage to the built environment. The Christchurch earthquake badly damaged over 6,000 residential 
properties, forced thousands to leave their homes and communities, and disrupted the city’s main 
lifelines including roads, water and wastewater networks, and electric distribution systems (Giovinazzi 
et al. 2011). This event compounded the effects of the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake, which occurred on 
the 4
th
 September 2010 and did not (directly) result in any fatalities but did cause widespread property 
and infrastructure damage.   
The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake heavily impacted the Canterbury region’s healthcare system. The 
main regional hospital, the Christchurch Hospital, sustained damage following the earthquake that 
severely strained the hospital’s ability to function at regular capacity. The continued functionality of 
critical infrastructure, such as healthcare facilities, is necessary following a disaster. In order to 
provide adequate services to patients, hospitals rely on a wide range of internal and external functions 
(e.g., power, water, communication, laundry, sterilization, etc.), each of which is part of a complex 
network of interacting systems. The loss of a single internal or external function can severely disrupt 
the ability to provide care at the level of demand needed during the critical first hours after a disaster 
(Kirsch et al., 2010).  
In a broad effort to support the recovery activities following the Christchurch earthquake, the Natural 
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Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded short-term projects that would connect the 
skills and knowledge from academic research with the practical needs of these organisations. The joint 
University of Canterbury/Johns Hopkins research team was awarded one of these NHRP grants for a 
project titled “Hospital Functions and Services,” which was designed to support the Canterbury Health 
District Board (CDHB) and the Canterbury Primary Response Group (CPRG). One of the project’s 
main goals was to provide the CDHB and the CPRG with standardised methods for collecting and 
analysing seismic reconnaissance data associated with the healthcare system. These data included 
photos and surveys of structural, non-structural, equipment, and lifeline damage that disrupted 
essential hospital functional areas and healthcare services. The impacts surveys include questions 
regarding the consequence for patient-care systems of losing any one or multiple functions in a 
hospital due to earthquake damage.  
The NHRP project benefited from collaboration with Johns Hopkins University (JHU) researchers, 
who had developed a survey tool to assess the impact of the Maule and Bío-Bío regions following the 
27
th
 February 2010, Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake in Chile (Kirsch et al., 2010). This project adapted the 
survey tool to match the needs of the CDHB Health Care System based on feedback from relevant 
CDHB personnel. The survey tool was then administered to several hospitals in the Canterbury region. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The survey tool was designed by co-authors Kirsch and Mitrani-Reiser and their colleagues (Mitrani-
Reiser et al., 2012) to capture standardized qualitative and quantitative information on the effects of 
earthquakes to hospital functionality. Their multi-section interview questionnaire can be completed in 
just one hour with the assistance of a knowledgeable hospital administrator. The survey also includes 
questions about baseline hospital statistics that are typically collected by phone or email after the 
interviews. This survey was originally designed based on feedback from Chilean Ministry of Health 
(MINSAL) employees, so some modification to the survey tool were required to adapt it for the 
CDHB Health Care System characteristics and the 22
nd
 February 2011 context.  
The refined ‘Health System Impact Survey’ includes two main separate surveys, where one is focused 
on all physical damage and engineering aspects, and the other is focused on related healthcare and 
service-area functional impacts. Each of these surveys has multiple sections and can be completed in 
an hour with relevant hospital personnel. The engineering survey is typically completed based on 
interviews with facility managers and/or engineers. This survey includes the following sections: site 
and structural description and impact, non-structural description and impact, geotechnical description 
and impact, supporting documentation (e.g., floor plans or damage photos), and summary of damage 
and functional disruption to hospital service areas (e.g., emergency department, kitchen, etc.). The 
healthcare survey is typically completed based on interviews with chief medical officers, nursing 
directors and/or emergency planners, and includes the following sections: baseline hospital 
information, event impact assessment, response (e.g., number of personnel available in the hours/days 
following the event) to the earthquake, and final observations (e.g., the major lessons learned after the 
event).  
The surveys described above were conducted after the Christchurch earthquake by a multi-institutional 
(University of Canterbury and JHU faculty and students), multidisciplinary team composed of experts 
in structural and earthquake engineering, risk assessment, disaster medicine, and international health. 
The interviews were completed between 8-15 August 2011 via phone and face-to-face interviews with 
facilities management staff, nurse managers, emergency planners and clinical staff across the CDHB 
(Table 1). The interviews targeted all the publicly owned hospitals that provide the majority of 
secondary and tertiary medical care in the Canterbury region, and two main private hospitals in 
Christchurch. Table 1 summarizes the hospitals that were contacted to be interviewed, the type of 
personnel that completed the damage and healthcare impact surveys with the research team, and the 
status of the interviews. As noted in Table 1, the researchers in New Zealand and the US continue to 
collaborate to complete the interviews in the remaining ten hospitals. This work includes remote 
interviews, and in-person meetings with stakeholders from the CDHB and the RHISE (Research re the 
Health Implications of Seismic Events) network. 
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Table 1. Summary of public and private hospitals in the Canterbury region that have been interviewed or contacted 
for interviews for this study as of December 2011. 
Hospital Type Hospital Name Interviewed Personnel Status 
C
D
H
B
 P
u
b
li
c 
H
o
sp
it
al
s 
Akaroa Hospital Nurse Manager Interviewed in person on 
11
th
 August 
Ashburton Hospital N/A In Progress 
Burwood Hospital N/A In Progress 
Christchurch 
Hospital 
Facilities Manager, Facilities Disaster 
Planner, and Director of Nursing 
Interviewed in person on 
10
th
 and 12
th
 August 
Darfield Hospital N/A In Progress 
Ellesmere Hospital Nurse Manager Interviewed by phone on 
9
th
 August 
Hillmorton Hospital N/A In Progress 
Kaikoura Hospital Nurse Manager Interviewed by phone on 
9
th
 August 
Lyndhurst Hospital N/A In Progress 
Oxford Hospital  N/A In Progress 
The Princess 
Margaret Hospital 
Nurse Coordinator, Facilities Manager, 
and Service Manager 
Interviewed in person on 
11
th
 August 
Rangiora Hospital N/A In Progress 
Timaru Hospital N/A In Progress 
Waikari Hospital  N/A In Progress 
C
h
ri
st
ch
u
rc
h
 
P
ri
v
at
e 
H
o
sp
it
al
s St. George's 
Hospital 
Director of Nursing and Facilities 
Manager 
Interviewed in person on 
11
th
 August 
Southern Cross 
Hospital 
N/A In Progress 
The following sections provide a first insight on the relation between engineering damage and loss of 
functionality following the 22
nd
 February earthquake for six of the hospitals within the Canterbury 
Region, with a special focus on Christchurch Hospital.  
3 PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL IMPACT OF THE CHRISTCHURCH HOSPITAL  
The Christchurch Hospital is located near the Avon River on lenses of liquefiable sediment. The site 
experienced 0.547g peak ground acceleration during the 22
nd
 February earthquake. The hospital’s 
ability to provide emergency care and proximity to the Central Business District (CBD) placed it at the 
forefront of the emergency response. Unfortunately, high levels of ground shaking and the area’s 
susceptibility to liquefaction led to structural and non-structural damage in the hospital, as well as 
failure of utilities and mechanical equipment in both clinical and non-clinical buildings (described in 
Sections 3.1-3.4). The sustained damage severely strained the hospital’s ability to operate. Existing 
back-up resources and the resourcefulness of the entire hospital staff, including that of Facilities 
Manager, Alan Bavis, Facilities Disaster Planner, Bruce Hall, and Director of Nursing, Heather Gray, 
played a critical role in stretching the functionality of the hospital in the emergency response phase of 
this disaster.   
3.1 Christchurch Hospital: Structure and Baseline Hospital Information 
Christchurch Hospital is the largest hospital in the Canterbury Region and the centre of the region’s 
healthcare system. Christchurch Hospital operates the only Emergency Department (ED) and Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) in Canterbury and performs the majority of elective surgeries. The hospital serves the 
geographically largest health district (CDHB) in New Zealand, which includes a population of 
560,000. The inpatient wards provide services to over 35,600 inpatients each year, of which 
approximately two-thirds are admitted acutely; a further 13,000 people are day patients. There are 
16,000 theatre visits each year and over 197,000 outpatient attendances, excluding those for radiology 
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and laboratory services. 
The hospital operated 600-
650 beds before the 
earthquake (Table 2), 
including 15 ICU beds, 18 
high-dependency beds, and 
9 step-down beds. Before 
the earthquake, the hospital 
typically operated at 
around 98% occupancy 
with a 48% admission rate 
from the ED to other 
wards. The hospital 
complex, shown in Figure 
1, is made up of several 
buildings constructed 
during different time 
periods using concrete-
shear-wall or reinforced-masonry construction. The buildings on the hospital campus include the 
Parkside Building (built in late 80s to early 90s), the Riverside Building (built in the 1970s), the 
Nurses Hostel (built in 1931, vacant prior to earthquake for scheduled demolition), the Diabetes 
Centre (built in late 1950s and early 1960s), and the Christchurch Women’s Hospital (built in 2005). 
The Christchurch Women’s Hospital (CWH) is the only base isolated structure on the South Island. 
The clinical buildings are bordered by the Avon River and Riccarton Avenue and are adjacent to 
Christchurch’s CBD.   
3.2 Geotechnical Failures and Structural Damage  
Geotechnical failures caused widespread damage to the hospital campus. For example, liquefaction 
caused flooding in the basements of all the buildings, including the Women’s Hospital. The Parkside 
and Riverside buildings suffered the worst flooding. All the retaining walls between the river and the 
hospital failed, and the lateral spreading near the river caused severe damage to sewage lines (Figure 
1a). Additionally, the tunnel that connects clinical facilities and non-clinical facilities across Riccarton 
Avenue was knee-deep in water after the earthquake.  
There were no catastrophic structural failures (i.e., local or global collapses) to any of clinical or non-
clinical buildings of Christchurch Hospital that were operating at the time of the 22
nd
 February 
earthquake. However, severe structural damage did cause some forced closures. For example, the 
underground tunnel carrying lifelines running below Riccarton Avenue was still unusable at the time 
of interviews (Figure 1b).  
 (a)  (b)      
Figure 1. Observed damage throughout hospital campus: a) liquefaction-induced damage to the 
main sewer line, and (b) damage to Riccarton underground tunnel (photo credit, Alan Bavis). 
Two administrative buildings on St. Asaph Street also had to be closed. The latter building suffered 
Figure 1. Layout of Christchurch Hospital 
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damage to the connection of the roof to the walls. The hospital’s parking structure did experience 
extensive structural damage, including spalled concrete of its beams and columns and cracking of its 
steel bracing. The cost to repair the parking structure’s damage is estimated to be NZ$2 million. 
Figure 2a shows damage to concrete columns on the ground floor of the parking structure. 
There was also widespread evidence of minor to moderate structural damage in several other 
buildings, including the Riverside Building, some non-clinical buildings, and the hospital’s boiler 
stack. The Riverside Building, for example, suffered shear wall cracking, where some of these cracks 
went all the way through the wall. All clinical buildings suffered roof damage. Also several buildings 
experienced damage across separation joint and firewalls. Figures 2b and 2c show examples of 
damage found on the Christchurch Hospital campus, including damage to at a separation joint in the 
Riverside Building and damage to a firewall in the CWH, respectively.  
    
    (a)          (b)             (c) 
Figure 2. Observed structural damage in non-clinical and clinical buildings: a) spalled concrete 
in ground-floor column of a parking structure, b) separation joint damage in Riverside Building, 
and c) damage to firewalls in the CWH (photo credit, Alan Bavis). 
In AS/NZ 1170.0 (SNZ 2004), critical facilities like hospital buildings are categorised with importance 
Level 4. The code provisions require that the buildings remain operational, particularly under 500 year 
serviceability limit state, SLS2, earthquakes (Uma and Beattie 2010). Christchurch Hospital buildings 
were designed and built as predominantly rectangular buildings with no L- or T- shaped structures, no 
abrupt discontinuities along the height of the buildings, and no large overhangs. The lack of these 
building features, along with the presence of separation joints in most buildings, and the base isolation 
of the CWH likely mitigated structural damage. Additionally, several older buildings on campus had 
been seismically upgraded before the earthquake. Those with retrofits only suffered cosmetic damage. 
Structural building initiatives and regulations alone cannot guarantee uninterrupted operation of a 
hospital following a large earthquake. Many other factors affect hospital functionality, such as lifelines 
and support agencies. Damaged non-structural components of a hospital system are typically the most 
disruptive factor following an earthquake (FEMA 2007). Damage to non-structural components of 
Christchurch Hospital are described below.  
3.3 Non-Structural Damage 
As is expected in other countries with similar design codes (FEMA 2007), the effects of damage to 
non-structural building components and equipment, as well as breakdowns in public services 
(lifelines), transportation, re-supply, and other organizational aspects, were far more disruptive to the 
functioning of Christchurch Hospital than the minor structural damage observed in buildings and 
facilities. The non-structural damage included the failures of many components: windows, non-load 
bearing ceilings, partition walls, floor coverings, medical equipment, and building contents.  
The failures of suspended ceilings, particularly the plaster tiles constructed with tongue-and-groove 
joints, proved to be one of the most disruptive non-structural failures in Christchurch Hospital. These 
heavy, thick ceilings act as effective fire barriers; however, when damaged, these older tiles are 
6 
dangerous falling hazards. When the plaster tile ceilings were first installed, they were diagonally 
braced to the walls. However, at some point after construction, these diagonal braces were replaced 
with less effective vertical ties that make the ceilings more susceptible to damage. Fallout and sagging 
(identified by laser level analysis) of ceiling tiles throughout the hospital campus necessitated the 
replacement of these non-structural components with lightweight ceiling tiles secured to the ceiling 
grid with clips and diagonal bracing. The ceiling repairs have required parts of the hospital to be 
closed down for periods ranging from hours to days; these repairs have been going on for months after 
the earthquake. Most of the inpatient wards were disrupted for two weeks while fire retardant tiles 
covering suspended ceilings were replaced. Many light fittings became dislodged and had to be 
replaced alongside ceiling tiles. The failures of suspended ceilings in particular led to precautionary 
evacuations immediately after the event, as described in Section 3.5.  
Non-load bearing wallboard partitions were also heavily damaged throughout the hospital. This mostly 
cosmetic damage did not cause loss of function immediately after the earthquake, but the areas 
damaged have had to be shut down for repair work months later. Severe plaster and concrete wall 
damage as well as damage to ceilings and glazing in the Diabetes Centre caused it to close for an 
entire month for repairs.  
Building components that are critical to vertical egress were also damaged during the earthquake. 
Most staircases in the clinical buildings were damaged and had to be propped up to remain operational 
in the emergency phase of the disaster. The stairs were eventually taken out of service one at a time 
and repaired during the recovery phase. The reason that so many staircases were damaged is that they 
were constructed with rigid connections to adjacent floors, which led to extensive cosmetic cracking in 
stairwell walls. Issues with power described in Section 3.4 also caused the emergency lights in some 
staircases to fail. Vertical egress was further impaired by damage to elevators. All elevators are 
traction elevators, except for one hydraulic elevator in the kitchen. Most elevators were out of function 
for a couple of hours because of activated seismic switches that force them to lock out in the event of 
an earthquake. The damage to these critical means of egress complicated regular hospital function 
immediately following the earthquake; however, hospital personnel continued to provide healthcare 
services and move patients through whatever means necessary, including carrying patients through 
darkened stairwells with the use of torches.  
The majority of all pumps and chillers in rooftop plant rooms jumped off their mounts due to strong 
shaking, even though the snubbers themselves were not damaged.  They were on seismic mounts 
according to NZ standards, NZS 4219:2009 (SNZ 2009). NZS 4219:2009 provides design guidelines 
for better seismic performance of engineering systems, requiring that all the proprietary components 
manufactured in New Zealand or overseas need to be verified for the performance level required (i.e. 
to be operational under serviceability level earthquake for hospital buildings) (Clause 2.4, SNZ 2009). 
In the CWH chillers moved around and piping for the condenser collapsed.  
The most functionally significant non-structural damage was to internal and external roof coverings 
and roof top water tanks in the Riverside Building. The consequent ingress of water into the top two 
(5
th
 and 6
th
) floors of this building caused the immediate evacuation of five adult medical wards, with 
about 30 patients each. There are no horizontal evacuation routes from these wards, so vertical egress 
was required. As was previously mentioned, the emergency lighting in the stairwells was not 
functional, so this patient evacuation took about 35 minutes to complete with flashlights. This was the 
only permanent loss of capacity at Christchurch Hospital (Section 3.5).  
3.4 Loss of Internal and External Services and Damage to Back-up Systems 
During the 22
nd
 February earthquake, all of the Municipal utility lifelines were damaged to varying 
degrees (Table 2). The main wastewater, water, and power distribution networks were completely off 
line (Giovinazzi et al. 2011). Additionally, the hospital suction and back-up power systems 
experienced partial to complete loss of function for a short period of time.  
Loss of power was one of the most major obstacles to the functionality of hospital services. Both the 
Parkside and Riverside Buildings lost power for one and a half hours. The hospital had back-up 
generators with 1.5 Megawatt capacity and one and a half days of fuel stock that were regularly tested. 
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However, some of these generators malfunctioned or were damaged, which effected the immediate 
functionality of the emergency power supply system. For example, the oil pressure gauge on the 
Riverside generator broke during the earthquake, which caused that generator to shut down 
immediately after turning on. The Parkside generators initially ran for a couple of hours, but stopped 
working because of clogged filters due to sediment in the tanks that had been disturbed by the ground 
shaking. The filters were replaced, but there some difficulty priming the fuel pumps. This was 
eventually corrected by syphoning fuel from a groundskeeper’s car to prime the pumps. In addition, 
shortages to the main low-voltage switchboard caused small fires, damaging the main electrical panel 
and further complicating the power restoration efforts. 
Damage to water and sewage systems, including fire sprinkler systems, also proved a major obstacle. 
Broken sewage pipes had to be replaced. Main water was out completely for a couple of days, and full 
water pressure was not restored for a week. The hospital had back-up water supplies (<1 day’s worth), 
and access to artesian wells, but these did not prove entirely sufficient. Some water could be 
successfully extracted from the boreholes immediately after the earthquake, but the silt content in that 
water was initially too high, which caused issues in moving the water from the ground to the storage 
tanks. Even when this issue was resolved, the water from the borehole could not be used for drinking. 
The lack of water impaired other systems as well, including the fire sprinklers, which could not be 
pressurized. Fortunately, there were no major fires after the event. To prevent this situation from 
occurring in any future disasters, a ½ million-litre capacity tank system was installed to provide 
emergency water for crucial systems, including the fire sprinklers.  
Suction in the Riverside building was also damaged, but was quickly restored by connecting the 
Riverside suction systems to the Parkside suction systems via a bypass in CWH. The ventilation 
system is highly important in maintaining an appropriate pressure gradient in different areas of the 
hospital. In infection-controlled areas, malfunction of this ventilation system could create a risk of 
infection to patients and staff (FEMA 2007).  The ductwork was un-operational for 30 minutes 
following the earthquake. Suction was regained by joining Parkside to Riverside buildings via the 
CWH bypass. 
3.5 Impact on Hospital Functionality and Residual Capacity of Health Care Delivery 
Emergency Phase: Emergency Response and Medical Evacuations 
The day of the earthquake, 22
nd
 February 2011, the Hospital admitted and dealt with 160 casualties. 
The triage after the quake was set up in the parking lot in front of the Emergency Department. There 
were no deaths related to the 22
nd
 February Earthquake in Christchurch hospital patients or staff, 
though four staff members were injured during the evacuation of some of the hospital wards. 
Evacuations of sick or injured patients are potentially dangerous events under any circumstances, but 
particularly are risky when moving a large group of patients with limited personnel, no power, and no 
elevators.  Due to water damage from leaking roof tanks, the top two floors of Riverside Building, 
including five adult medical wards, were evacuated immediately after the earthquake. The darkness of 
the stairwells and the unavailability of elevators (Section 3.3) made evacuation very difficult. Most 
patients were able to walk down on their own, but some had to be carried down five to six flights of 
stairs in the dark. Many patients and some staff self-evacuated after the event to areas perceived as 
safer locations outside the buildings. The third floor of Riverside Building was evacuated in a 
subsequent phase. All evacuations after the initial Riverside evacuation were simply horizontal 
movement. These evacuations were triggered by failures of suspended ceilings, the lack of 
functionality of fire sprinkler system, and the lack of sufficient pressure in the back up water system. 
The charted oncology unit was also moved to Christchurch’s Women Hospital. A total of 350 patients 
were evacuated from the hospital overall. The Oxford Clinic, a general practice located down the road, 
evacuated to Christchurch Hospital.  
Supplies and non-clinical services were mostly undamaged. The kitchen maintained its functionality, 
guarantying the provision of food. However, the laundry was shipped out for two days because of 
short-staffing and lack of water; half of the laundry was handled by Timaru Hospital during this time. 
Drinking water was provided in bottles brought by a private company. The pharmacy did not run out 
of pharmaceuticals, blood products, dressings, splints, surgical supplies, or other any other treatment 
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supplies. Similarly, there was no loss or shortage of lab supplies, radiological supplies, or other 
diagnostic supplies. Two off-site laboratories used by the hospital, one of which was located in the 
CBD, were shut down, but the onsite laboratory remained functional. All the shelves containing the 
records tipped over. 
Short-term Losses of Health Care Capacity 
The hospital never closed completely. The adult wards on the 5th and 6th floor of Riverside were the 
only closures during the quake, making 106 adult medical beds unusable (or a 16% loss in capacity) 
One child assessment unit had to be temporarily repurposed to treat adults. Twelve ICU patients were 
evacuated to other ICUs in the North Dunedin, Nelson and the North Island. 
Christchurch hospital stopped all elective surgery and outpatient services immediately after the 
emergency in order to surge capacity. This decision greatly reduced the number of patients in the 
clinical buildings. There were approximately 320 inpatients in the hospital after 24 hours, 270 after 72 
hours, and 400 after 7 days 
Nuclear medicine and clinical engineering were undamaged, but had staffing problems. The Dialysis 
Centre closed for repairs after the earthquake, though it moved and reopened elsewhere. Outpatient 
services were lost for one day after the quake, and reduced for the next two weeks. Rehabilitation, and 
physical therapy were also lost for the first day and partially down for a week. 
Long-Term Rebalancing of Canterbury Health System  
The evacuation of adult wards in the Riverside building top two floors (5
th
 and 6
th
) and transfer to 
Princess Margaret Hospital, (Table 1) to date has been the only permanent loss of capacity at 
Christchurch Hospital. Due to the lack of horizontal egress and the presence of only a single stairwell, 
the decision was made to permanently change the use of those floors from clinical wards to 
administrative space. The loss of those Riverside wards means that 106 beds were lost, which is 16 per 
cent of the hospital's normal capacity. About 70 beds at Princess Margaret Hospital (PMH) and 
another 10 beds at Ashburton Hospital were created for long-term care to compensate for the loss. 
Initiatives like Community Rehabilitation, Enablement and Support Teams, CREST, have been used 
to reduce the pressure on Christchurch Hospital; the initiative caters to some 240 clients a day. The 
CDHB predicted a shortfall of 740 elective surgery cases for the year, down 5 per cent on the annual 
target. About 500 elective surgeries such as hip replacements were contracted out to the private 
hospitals Southern Cross and St Georges (The Press 2011). 
4 PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ON THE CANTERBURY HOSPITAL 
NETWORK 
Canterbury’s Health system is comprised of 14 publicly owned hospitals, which provide the majority 
of secondary and tertiary medical care (Table 1). A smaller not-for-profit private hospital sector 
specializes mainly in elective surgery and long-term care (Table 1). The private hospitals are operated 
directly or subsidised by the Canterbury District Health Board. The “third sector” providers, made of 
non-profit non-government organizations (Health, M. O. 2011), offer other services, including general 
practitioners (GPs), nursing homes, and ambulance service. Following the Canterbury earthquakes, 
damage to facilities and lifelines placed considerable strain upon the Canterbury health care system, 
specifically Christchurch’s network of private/public hospitals, GPs, and elderly care facilities. To 
cope with demand, the health system has had to utilize the entire health network’s capacity. 
4.1. CDHB Public and Private Hospital System: Structure and Baseline Hospital Information 
CDHB public and private hospitals have different specialities. Ashburton Hospital, located outside of 
Christchurch, mainly performs lab work and radiology, as well as providing maternity and 
physiotherapy services. Burwood Hospital specializes in recovery. Hillmorton Hospital accounts for 
most of Christchurch’s mental health facilities. Princess Margaret Hospital provides predominantly 
geriatric care and includes psychiatric wards. Private hospitals St Georges and Southern Cross provide 
maternity care and elective surgery. Med laboratory, Canterbury laboratory, and Christchurch Hospital 
laboratory are responsible for most of the blood tests from GPs and hospitals within Canterbury 
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(Health, M. O. 2010).  The Canterbury CDHB/private sector hospital system includes seven rural 
Regional Hospitals: Rangiora, Waikari, Oxford, Akaroa, Kaikoura, Darfield and Ellesmere. These 
Regional Hospitals are small (<20 beds) and primarily handle elderly and maternity patients. All 
hospitals in the region actively liaise with one another in order to provide efficient care and cope with 
capacity shortages. 
4.2. Summary of Functional Loss and Deployed Residual Capacity in the Aftermath of the Earthquake 
for the CDHB Public and Private Hospital System 
Following the 22
nd
 February Earthquake, Akaroa Hospital, Kaikoura Hospital and Ellesmere Regional 
Hospitals suffered limited damage to their structural and non-structural elements and remained 
operational (Table 2). Of these hospitals, only Akaroa Hospital lost any external services. That 
hospital lost electricity and water but had sufficient backup systems (Table 2). Akaroa experienced 
only minor non-structural cracking following the February 22
nd
 earthquake; however, it was closed 
down for one week after the 4
th
 September  Mw 7.1 earthquake due to damage to the chimneys, which 
were subsequently removed.  
 
Princess Margaret Hospital lost water main water completely for 12 hours and did not regain full water 
pressure for a week. Sewage systems were damaged, and may have been inoperable for as long as two 
weeks. Separation joints in the hospital experienced some damage, and most walls sustained plaster 
damage. The buildings of PMH are concrete with brick veneer. That brick veneer had vertical, 
diagonal, and horizontal cracking, generally ranging from 1-4 mm. There were, however, no structural 
failures to the concrete structure. Water and sewage pipes for this hospital were damaged and diffusers 
popped out. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Services Loss by Hospital 
 
Christchurch 
Hospital 
PMH 
Hospital 
St George's 
Hospital 
Kaikoura 
Hospital 
Akaroa 
Hospital 
Ellesmere 
Hospital 
External Services       
    Electricity Y  Y (4hr) Y N Y (1dy) N 
    Backup electric Y(1.5hr) N N (4dy) N N N 
    Water Y (1wk) Y(12hr) Y (14dy) N Y (3dy) N 
    Sewer N Y(2wk) Y (3dy) N N N 
    Telephones Y(20min) Y(6hr) Y N Y (1dy) N 
Internal Services       
    Computers N N N N N N 
    Medical gases N N Y(4dy) N N N 
    Suction Y(30min) N Y(3dy) N NA NA 
    Total Services lost 4 4 4 0 3 0 
 
St. Georges Hospital was closed completely due to structural damage to the maternity ward 
(permanently closed awaiting demolition) and liquefaction damage to the Cancer Centre (Table 3). St. 
Georges Hospital’s dominant business is elective surgery, but the main recovery wards and operating 
theatres were closed for two weeks due to loss of services and widespread non-structural damage to 
walls (Table 2).  
Many hospitals were forced to alter the way they provided non-clinical services immediately after the 
earthquake. The Regional Hospitals were able perform their own services such as laundry (usually 
done at Hillmorton Hospital) and food preparation in the aftermath of the quake (Table 2). Timaru 
Hospital provided clean linen to Christchurch Hospital (that lost Laundry services for 2 days, as above 
mentioned). Princess Margaret’s Hospital lost its laundry services for 7 days (Table 2); Ashburton 
Hospital helped source clean linen, but existing stock had to be conserved.  
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All the Regional Hospitals participated in the redistribution of capacity from damaged healthcare 
facilities in Christchurch in the form of accepting transferred elderly care and/or maternity patients in 
the days after the earthquake. The patients were from Princess Margaret Hospital and various elderly 
care facilities within badly damaged areas of Christchurch (Table 3).  
Table 3. Summary of capacity by Hospital following the February 22nd earthquake 
Capacity Initial capacity 
Residual 
capacity 
Patients 
during EQ 
Discharged in 
first 48 hours 
Transferred 
in first week 
1. Christchurch Hospital 650 beds 544beds - - (-) 44 
2. Princess Margaret Hospital 147 beds 147 beds 109 1 (+)47 
3. St George's Hospital 101 beds 80 beds 52 52 0 
4. Kaikoura Hospital 26 beds 26 beds 15 0 (+) 3 
5. Akaroa Hospital 8 beds 8 beds 8 8 (+) 8 
6. Ellesmere Hospital 10 beds 10 beds 8 0 (+) 3 
5 CONCLUSION  
The damage that impacted the Christchurch Hospital following the 22
nd
 February Earthquake included 
minor structural damage to both clinical and support buildings, non-structural damage to ceiling tiles 
and light fittings, outages of all the city lifelines systems, and damage to internal services and back-up 
generators. For all the CDHB hospital facilities, the widespread non-structural damage was more 
disruptive than the minor/moderate structural damage sustained by the buildings. All buildings had 
been built or retrofitted to comply with the requirement of NZ Seismic Design Standards (SNZ 2004). 
In Christchurch Hospital, non-structural damage to suspended ceilings, light fittings, and water piping 
forced wards to be evacuated during the emergency phase and to remain closed in the longer-term, as 
well as requiring lengthily disruptive repairs to be carried out in the following months. The loss of 
water, sewage, power, caused disruption to the hospital’s functionality and to the delivery of health 
care in the days and weeks following the earthquake.  Hospital planning activities should focus on 
identifying non-structural and functional vulnerabilities within all critical service areas and mitigating 
their possible impact with engineering interventions, redundancy systems or alternative resources. 
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